The to?Quine, sensory evidence is all the evidence there

The two fundamental
tenets of Quine’s naturalized epistemology are: skepticism about a priori knowledge, and psychology – the
idea psychological?processes that
generate and sustain a belief are relevant to its justification.  &*)(^$$

Quine
denies that we can know any epistemological principles a priori. Naturalists are dubious about the a priori for a variety of reasons. Quine argues?that
the analytic/synthetic distinction is unsupportable. Previous generations of philosophers
believed that it was possible to make a sharp distinction between truths of
meaning and truths of fact. Analytic?truths were?held to be known a
priori, synthetic truths a posteriori.
If we share Quine’s assumption that analytic truths are truths of?meaning, and that language is the vehicle of meaning,
then?details of language?acquisition
take on philosophical?significance.
According to?Quine, sensory evidence is all the
evidence there is for the?meanings of words. Quine argues that all of our knowledge
is an inseparable combination of a
posteriori and a priori truth. _)(*&[email protected]$#%

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            Unlike logical empiricists, Quine does not believe that
every meaningful expression is keyed?directly to
observable experience. Some phrases are?inculcated by
explicit?definition, but others are inferred?or projected beyond observational data.?:”{}_()

            Quine believes that learning of a language?is a form of scientific?discovery.
Every?infant learns their?native
tongue by observing the?behavior of adult
speakers in their environment. The infant learns to associate?phrases with publicly observable objects. She must
extrapolate general principles from a small number of observations. )(*&_____________(*

            Some of these?children will grow
up to be?philosophers. If they are?trained in the Anglo-American tradition, they?will go on to analyze these empirically-generated
concepts. Traditional epistemologists argue that this activity is a unique?philosophical method that separates philosophical
inquiry from?empirical inquiry. On the traditional
view, the philosopher is engaging in a
priori reflection on a concept in order to extract?analytic
truths about that concept. But according to the?naturalized
epistemologist, the?philosopher is not?engaging in a pure a
priori reasoning. Instead, she is reflecting on an empirically-based theory
– the theory she developed datum-by-datum?in the course of
language?learning. If all of our concepts are
already assembled from experience, then it seems foolish to restrict ourselves
to an?arbitrary subset of so-called a priori truths. $&(&()*_)+_((&

            Psychology, the second fundamental.principle of Quine’s!naturalized
epistemology, is the idea that beliefs are justified by the psychological
processes that generate and”sustain
them. Weak}psychology}holds that the concepts}and the?findings of empirical psychology are relevant. 709808^&(%&

            It is clear from|Quine’s description of!his program that|he is a(strong|psychologist:

            “Naturalized epistemology studies a natural phenomenon,
viz. a physical human subject. This human subject is accorded experimentally
controlled input—certain patterns of irradiation in assorted frequencies, for
instance—and in the fullness of time the subject delivers as output a
description of the three dimensional external world and its history. The
relation between the meager input and the torrential output is a relation that
we are prompted to study for somewhat the same reasons that always prompted
epistemology; namely in order to see how evidence relates to theory, and in
what ways one’s theory of nature transcends any available evidence” (Quine,
275) #%$&^&([email protected]

Quine’s?Naturalized?Epistemology

            Quine|states?that epistemology?is about the?foundations of science.?For
him, the foundations of?science are the|foundations?of our|knowledge of the?external}world.|||||||| #$^%(

            |Quine?identifies|two?sub-projects?within?traditional|epistemology: thedoctrinal?andthe
conceptual.?Doctrinalepistemologyistheattemptto?deriveour?knowledgeof theworldfrom immediate|experience. Conceptual?inquiriesclarify
our?epistemicconcepts
by|defining less
obvious|ones in|terms of?more|obvious?ones. @#$^?%)*&^

&([email protected]

Quine’s?Naturalized?Epistemology

            Quine|states?that epistemology?is about the?foundations of science.?For
him, the foundations of?science are the|foundations?of our|knowledge of the?external}world.|||||||| #$^%(

            |Quine?identifies|two?sub-projects?within?traditional|epistemology: thedoctrinal?andthe
conceptual.?Doctrinalepistemologyistheattemptto?deriveour?knowledgeof theworldfrom immediate|experience. Conceptual?inquiriesclarify
our?epistemicconcepts
by|defining less
obvious|ones in|terms of?more|obvious?ones. @#$^?%)*&^